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BLACK SOLDIERS 
AT FORT HAYS, KANSAS, 1867 .. 1869 
A STUDY IN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY VIOLENCE 
JAMES N. LEIKER 
Historians of the western army contend with 
many romanticized myths. Few of those myths, 
in recent years, have held the popular con-
sciousness as has that of the army's first black 
regulars, known as "buffalo soldiers." By now, 
the origins of the segregated regiments are 
quite familiar. In 1866, with the nation's act-
ing military force having dwindled ro a frac-
tion of its Civil War size, the Republican 
Congress encouraged the enlistment of newly 
freed slaves and northern free blacks. Assigned 
to remote western areas, black units played an 
instrumental role over the next few decades in 
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opening the West for white settlement. Despite 
their important functions, uniformed African 
Americans continually suffered racism and dis-
crimination from frontier civilians and even 
from some of their own white officers. l 
For much of this century, both popular cul-
ture and professional historians overlooked the 
buffalo soldiers. The gallant stereotype of pa-
triotic, blue-jacketed warriors bringing civili-
zation to the plains failed to accommodate the 
presence of armed blacks. Although scholars 
began to draw public attention toward black 
soldiers as early as the 1960s, the dedication of 
a buffalo soldiers monument at Fort 
Leavenworth in 1992 fully captured the popu-
lar imagination, partly because of Colin 
Powell's visible involvement. The Leaven-
worth project was accompanied by a veritable 
explosion of buffalo soldiers commemorations 
including museum displays, documentaries, 
newspaper and journal articles, and reenact-
ment societies. Where once the public imag-
ined the West only in terms of white soldiers 
and red Indians, the present fascination repre-
sents a positive step in defining the region as a 
meeting ground for numerous races and cul-
tures, a step that scholars should applaud. 
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Yet not all have been enthusiastic about 
proclaiming buffalo soldiers' contributions to 
western conquest. From a Native American 
standpoint, lionizing the black regiments to 
redress historical neglect appears no more just 
nor progressive than the Anglo myths that ex-
cluded them. When the U.S. Postmaster Gen-
eral announced a commemorative buffalo 
soldiers stamp in 1994, representatives of the 
American Indian Movement demanded both 
the stamp's withdrawal and a public apology.2 
For all the topic's recent attention, few grasp 
its frustrating irony: that black males, them-
selves victims of white prejudice, voluntarily 
aided the subjugation of Native peoples for 
the benefit of Anglo expansion. This scenario 
illustrates the complicated, even paradoxical, 
nature of American race relations. Unfortu-
nately, significant questions are overshadowed 
by the topic's "contribution" aspects, helping 
to provide a focus for national and racial pride, 
a cry of "we were there too." Nor have aca-
demic historians pursued the more difficult 
questions as aggressively as they should. New 
Western History, which has debunked many 
myths surrounding white occupation and 
shown its catastrophic consequences for mi-
norities, generally ignores the army's role in 
western conquest. Military histories have added 
tremendously to knowledge about the subject 
but most employ traditional approaches that 
are more event-centered and descriptive than 
analytical and interpretive. 
The time appears right for a serious reap-
praisal of the army's first black regulars, one 
that resists the temptation to cast them either 
as villainous enforcers of white oppression or 
heroic subjects of injustice. The former depic-
tion rests on the questionable assumption that 
blacks shared whites' racist attitudes toward 
Indians; the latter, more common view treats 
them as passive victims, stoically enduring dis-
crimination. Both rob the buffalo soldiers of 
conscious agency, seeing them not as histori-
cal actors but merely as "acted upon." In fact, 
when uniformed blacks entered the hostile ra-
cial climate of western towns, some acquiesced 
to white racism but others violently resisted. 
Although holding limited options, buffalo sol-
diers' individual reactions to civilian antago-
nism played a vital role in local race relations. 
SETTING THE SCENE 
Fort Hays, located in northwest Kansas, 
serves as an example of black agency. Active 
from 1865 to 1889, its garrison protected stage-
coach and railway traffic along the Smoky Hill 
River to Denver.3 Stationed there in the late 
1860s, troops from the Thirty-eighth Infantry 
and Tenth Cavalry (both consisting entirely 
of black soldiers) comprised the majority of 
the post's enlisted men up to 1869. Though 
engaged in several Indian battles, the average 
black soldier had more reason to fear civilians 
or even comrades than Indians; more injuries 
and killings resulted from altercations in camp 
or nearby Hays City than from combat. While 
Fort Hays's troubles were not unique, the un-
usual mingling of a predominantly black mili-
tary with growing numbers of white civilians 
led to racial violence that mirrored and even 
surpassed that in other western communities.4 
Given Kansas' early reputation among Afri-
can Americans as a safe haven for freedmen, 
such an assertion might seem surprising. After 
all, Kansas had been among the first states to 
muster black volunteers into Union service.s 
Even after the Civil War, images of "Bleeding 
Kansas" and John Brown enhanced the state's 
prestige among southern blacks as a place of 
opportunity and freedom. In the late 1870s, 
thousands of "exodusters"-emigrants fleeing 
the South after Reconstruction-chose Kansas 
as their destination. While most exodusters 
found only disillusionment in the so-called 
"Canaan of the Prairies," active state charity 
organizations worked diligently to ease the refu-
gees' plight.6 In addition, Kansas claimed sev-
eral black communities, among them 
Nicodemus, established in 1877 only fifty miles 
northwest of Hays City. If any state could have 
been expected to tolerate a high population 
of black soldiers, it should have been Kansas. 
While the legacies of abolition and the 
Civil War may have encouraged relative open-
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FIG. 1. Main street, Hays City, Kansas, 1871 . Courtesy of Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, 
Kansas. 
ness in the state's eastern communities, how-
ever, isolated locales like Fort Hays initially 
shared little with Lawrence and Leavenworth. 
During the black units' peak enlistment in the 
late 1860s, the new forts and towns truly epito-
mized the "frontier," the peripheral edge of 
white settlement socially and geographically. 
While "frontier" as an analytical concept has 
been criticized for its ethnocentric connota-
tions, the term retains usefulness for discover-
ing how racial hatreds were transferred to the 
developing region. 7 By examining how the ci-
vilian community perceived and interacted 
with black soldiers, we can draw a clearer pic-
ture of how the black military experience 
helped to shape western race relations. 
Understanding the reception of black sol-
diers in Hays City first necessitates an exami-
nation of the military and social atmosphere at 
Fort Hays. As Indian raids diminished by late 
1867, three Tenth Cavalry companies were 
recalled for winter rest at Fort Riley, leaving 
Fort Hays largely under the protection of black 
infantry.s Because of its central location and 
proximity to the railroad, Fort Hays served as 
General Philip Sheridan's administrative head-
quarters and a depot for goods arriving by rail 
during the 1868-69 campaign. Although small 
cavalry detachments remained until 1871, in-
fantry comprised the garrison's majority. Thus, 
if Fort Hays could claim a "semi-permanent" 
black population up to 1869, the Thirty-eighth 
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FIG. 2. Buffalo soldiers at Fort Hays guarding a U.S . express overland stage coach preparing to depart for 
Denver. Courtesy of Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas. 
Infantry fit that role better than the more tran-
sient Tenth Cavalry. 
Narratives often focus on the cavalry's dra-
matic offensive campaigns and overlook in-
fantrymen, who performed the more routine 
tasks of escorting surveying parties, military 
prisoners, and payroll and supply shipments. 
Infantry also received a disproportionate share 
of kitchen and hospital duties and sanitation 
detail. Although their activities attracted less 
attention, they nonetheless performed hazard-
ous tasks in isolated groups of four or five that 
were vulnerable to surprise attacks. Troopers 
knew full well the perils of their work. Com-
plaints reached the fort commander in July 
1868 about five soldiers from the Thirty-eighth 
assigned to protect railroad water tanks. Housed 
in small shelters with ten-day rations, the troops 
fired indiscriminately at anyone-white, black, 
or Indian-who ventured too close. Lest the 
frightened infantrymen fire on peaceful Na-
tive people and provoke conflict, officers or-
dered them to deal cautiously with anyone who 
approached rather than resorting to gunfire.9 
Black soldiers often are depicted as victims, 
thereby emphasizing the army's racial preju-
dice. Indeed, discrimination did occur; troops 
frequently suffered abuse by bigoted officers 
and received harsher punishments than white 
soldiers for disciplinary offenses. The prohibi-
tion against blacks' serving as officers even in 
their own regiments indicates the army's low 
initial regard for their abilities. IO Yet deplor-
able conditions awaited all of the western 
army's enlisted men, no matter their color. 
None would have asserted "equality" as a goal; 
the military, after all, constituted a system of 
institutionalized inequality. But that did not 
negate the possibility of fair treatment from 
officers who interacted with the men on a daily 
basis. In fact, at Fort Hays, white commanders 
often became their troops' greatest partisans, 
even protecting them from hostile civilians. In 
a macabre way, blacks and whites stationed 
there achieved a certain degree of equality: 
both lived abominably. 
Fort Hays differed little from most outposts 
during its first few months, consisting merely 
of several tents and crude huts. Its isolated 
location limited the range of leisure activi-
ties-not that much leisure time was avail-
able. Poor hygiene and sanitation rendered 
soldiers vulnerable to disease. Beginning in 
July 1867, a devastating cholera epidemic 
swept the western forts, striking the black units 
especially hard. Cholera killed seven men of 
the Thirty-eighth Infantry that summer but the 
Tenth Cavalry lost more than twenty men, more 
than half the regiment's total number of com-
bat deaths up to 1918.11 Conditions gradu-
ally improved after the Union Pacific Railroad 
reached Hays in October 1867, particularly 
because it brought fresh supplies and materi-
als for building permanent structures. Yet poor 
health continued to sap the garrison's strength. 
Despite their dangerous duties, soldiers ob-
tained medical treatment more frequently for 
pneumonia and other ailments than for com-
bat injuries. Gastrointestinal illnesses were es-
pecially common; nearly a third of the post's 
black soldiers received treatment for diarrhea. 12 
Health officials knew that improved hy-
giene and fresh food would decrease these prob-
lems yet found implementing such simple 
improvements difficult. Quartermasters unsuc-
cessfully tried to provide unspoiled meat, 
while either insects or neglect doomed the 
post's paltry attempt at growing its own veg-
etables. \3 Most enlisted men, regardless of 
color, cared little for personal cleanliness. 
Assistant surgeon William Buchannon com-
plained that Tenth cavalrymen stacked all 
their dirty clothes and muddy stable equip-
ment under the bunks, attracting flies to an 
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already crowded and improperly ventilated 
barracks. 14 
Constant guard and escort duty, as well as 
the transient nature of army life, makes such 
apathy seem understandable. Similarly, Fort 
Hays' hectic work load left enlisted men little 
time or inclination to attend the post school 
that taught reading and writing, addition and 
subtraction. What leisure time existed was 
spent enjoying the benefits of steady pay. Earn-
ings ranged from thirteen dollars a month for 
new privates to thirty dollars for noncommis-
sioned officers. Although some men sent money 
to families back east, most wages purchased 
necessities from the post sutler's store or from 
local civilian merchants. A considerable 
amount ended up in the town's many taverns 
and brothels. 
Drunkenness affected all troops at Fort Hays, 
including buffalo soldiers. Post records include 
many accounts of privates charged with ne-
glecting duty or engaging in disorderly con-
duct while under the influence of alcohol. 
Perhaps because their isolated work made it 
easier and more tempting to sneak a drink, the 
Thirty-eighth Infantry seemed particularly 
prone to such problems. In February 1868 the 
commander placed pickets to arrest all per-
sonnel who were intoxicated, created a dis-
turbance, or lacked passes signed by a superior 
officer. Typical punishment for drink-related 
offenses involved a fine, brief incarceration, 
or a reduction in rank. 15 
Why the high frequency of alcohol use? The 
combination of disease, separation from fam-
ily, fear of Indian attack, and generalloneli-
ness likely inspired many to seek solace from a 
bottle. Frontier racism made intoxication par-
ticularly dangerous for black soldiers. Since 
the white public perceived the black units as 
experimental at best, charges of drunkenness 
and immorality could easily taint black regi-
ments' reputations. At Fort Hays, the picket 
guard decreased alcohol-related offenses but 
did not necessarily increase sobriety. When 
getting drunk on the fort became too risky, sol-
diers waited until payday and visited taverns 
in Hays City. This proved dangerous for the 
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black soldier since he was subject to civilian 
law, not military, and white locals had ex-
tremely little patience with unruly armed 
blacks. 
The violent atmosphere and miserable, dis-
ease-ridden conditions encouraged many de-
sertions from the frontier military. In 1867 more 
than 14,000 men deserted the United States 
Army, nearly a quarter of its total strength. 16 
Most deserters disappeared successfully into 
civilian populations; the military simply 
lacked the time and manpower to pursue run-
aways. Cavalrymen especially were likely to 
make clean breaks since they took their horses 
and all the army property they could carry, 
including food, mules, wagons, and firearms. 
Elizabeth Custer described how forty men de-
serted Fort Hays in one night, leaving officers 
fearful that the garrison would soon lack suf-
ficient protection. 17 
Romanticized works on buffalo soldiers 
point proudly to their low desertion rates, a 
claim partly supported by statistics from Fort 
Hays. While more than half of the Seventh 
Cavalry deserted in only one year, a mere four-
teen deserters were reported from Fort Hays' 
black regiments during its first five years. IS Al-
though drunkenness and insubordination were 
common among all enlisted men, desertion 
appeared primarily to be a white phenomenon. 
The dearth of black western settlers, and black 
soldiers' distinctive appearance, made it diffi-
cult for potential deserters to blend into 
nearby communities. One should not, however, 
discount the more idealistic explanation that 
blacks' group identity and pride discouraged 
desertion. Despite its pitfalls, military service 
offered African American males opportunities 
for self-respect seldom matched in Reconstruc-
tion America. 
Desertion rates remained high throughout 
the post-Civil War period but peaked in 
1871.19 By then Indian resistance in the Hays 
vicinity had nearly disappeared, even though 
the fort remained a valuable transportation 
depot and winter quarters. As white settlement 
increased, a reciprocal relationship developed 
between the post and nearby Hays City. Town 
merchants provided needed goods and services 
while the army employed civilian laborers on 
construction projects. Likewise, the thousands 
of dollars of army pay spent in Hays City fer-
tilized a prosperous local economy. 
Beneath this symbiosis lay major currents 
of hostility. Hays City resembled other west-
ern communities where violence between sol-
diers and civilians contributed to the region's 
reputation for bloodshed. If Civil War veter-
ans were praised as heroes, federal regulars, 
often immigrants and displaced industrial 
workers, were often seen as rabble. 20 The pro-
liferation of saloons and brothels that sprang 
up around every military post offended new 
settlers' puritanical values. 21 In addition, many 
westerners dismissed the federal regulars as 
ineffective Indian fighters, even resenting their 
presence. One Kansan, explaining why the 
state militia could deal with local hostilities 
more effectively, ridiculed the army's cease-
less bugling, alerting enemies as soldiers pre-
pared to attack, retreat, awake, or go to bed. 22 
Uniformed soldiers frequently elicited jokes 
or insults from civilians, not respect. In the 
case of a uniformed freedman, reactions could 
be openly hostile, especially among former 
Confederates for whom buffalo soldiers pro-
vided a visible reminder of southern defeat. 
These charged emotions played out in the 
chaos of western communities during early 
years of development. Although scholarship 
on Kansas cattle towns emphasizes the exag-
geration of violence in popular myth, Hays 
City, established in October 1867 as a Union 
Pacific terminus, lay beyond most major cattle 
trails, and its violence came not from rowdy 
Texas cattle drovers but from transients look-
ing for profits from the railroad. 23 An eastern 
Kansas newspaper described Hays' citizenry in 
unflattering terms: 
Gamblers, pimps, prostitutes, and dead 
beats, run the town, and the most unblush-
ing defiance of everything that is decent is 
the prevailing sentiment. One year ago, for 
the joke of the thing, they elected a prosti-
tute as one of the School Board, and an-
other Street Commissioner. How it is to be 
expected black or white soldiers will act 
any other way when they get a taste of the 
lightning poison vended there is a mystery 
to us. We hope the authorities of the State 
will incur no expense in protecting any such 
a class as runs Hays City.24 
Observers did not exaggerate the town's hor-
rific level of violence; from 1867 to 1874, 
Hays City saw more than thirty recorded homi-
cides. 25 During periods of ineffective civilian 
law enforcement, black troops served as the 
town guard. In late 1867, a visitor recorded 
that: 
Hays City is really under martial law, the 
town being policed by soldiers from the fort; 
and, what makes it trebly obnoxious to some, 
the soldiers are colored. They certainly have 
the credit, however, of maintaining quiet 
and general good order throughout the day 
and night: that is, quiet for a frontier town.26 
Actually, the presence of federal regulars ex-
acerbated more violence than it prevented. 
Nearly half of all homicides up to 1874, thir-
teen, resulted from altercations between sol-
diers and civiliansY 
Considering the color of the troops in-
volved, a problem arises in trying to separate 
"racial" violence from the larger pattern of ci-
vilian-military violence everywhere, regardless 
of race. Simply because an episode involved a 
black participant did not mean it had racial 
causes. The key distinction rests on whether an 
incident originated from some discriminatory 
behavior based on skin color. By that criteria, 
not all violence involving blacks duri:ng Hays 
City's first three years can be classified as "ra-
cial." But the Fort Hays experience certainly 
shows a hardening of white opinions toward 
armed African Americans, reflected not only 
in the callous actions of local toughs but in 
how state newspapers reported such activity. 
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Black soldiers did not behave like passive 
victims of prejudice. The same group cohe-
sion that discouraged black desertions encour-
aged a search for vengeance when a soldier 
was wronged or insulted. White troops shared 
the feud mentality that characterized fort-town 
relations; if an individual returned to the post 
bruised or bloodied, comrades shielded him 
from discovery until they could get revenge 
on his assailants. 28 For buffalo soldiers, how-
ever, the drive to retaliate appeared especially 
strong. During a national age of violent rac-
ism, the army's black frontiersmen upheld the 
doctrine of "eye for an eye." Their refusal to 
tolerate abuse certainly deserves a measure of 
admiration, but their actions ultimately in-
tensified white prejudice, creating a cycle of 
hatred that resembled an ongoing blood feud. 
THE FIRST VIOLENT ENCOUNTER 
The first violent encounter, initiated by 
townspeople, illustrates how officers generally 
sided with their men. Prior to the picket 
guard's establishment in February 1868, post 
commanders had to deal with the habitual 
problem of troops leaving the fort without per-
mission. On 21 December 1867, a small de-
tail was sent to retrieve all those absent 
without leave, most of whom were imbibing 
in civilian saloons. Privates Charles Allen, 
Thirty-eighth Company E, and John Wash-
ington, Tenth Cavalry Company I, demanded 
admittance to an establishment where AWOL 
soldiers reportedly languished. When they 
were refused, Allen began beating the door 
with his weapon. The saloonkeeper, Matthew 
"Red" Flinn, fired several shots, killing Allen 
and severely wounding Washington. The 
town guard, Allen's fellow infantrymen, im-
mediately began searching for Flinn. Later 
the same evening a local named Cornelius 
Doyle accosted Corporal Albert E. Cropper, 
Thirty-eighth Company G, cursing him and 
shouting that "any damned nigger soldiers 
hunting Red" would be killed. The argument 
ended when Doyle apparently attempted to 
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FIG. 3. Passersby view the bodies of Private George Sumner and Private Peter Welsh the morning after they had 
been killed in Hays City by their comrade Private David Roberts, 6 September 1873. All were from the white Sixth 
Cavalry. The bodies were removed by an ambulance from the fort and Roberts was convicted of manslaughter. The 
viewers seem inured to the violent climate. Courtesy of Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas. 
draw his pistol and Cropper fatally shot him 
with his rifle. 29 
While Allen's death produced no great up-
roar, talk immediately filled the streets about 
lynching Cropper. Civilian newspapers de-
scribed Doyle's shooting far differently than 
the official military report. The Hays City Rail-
way Advance claimed Doyle gave Cropper no 
"provocation whatever," a charge repeated by 
a Hays resident in a hearsay letter to the 
Lawrence Tribune. 30 Following his arrest and 
preliminary hearing, Cropper was transferred 
to the post guardhouse for his own protection. 
Meanwhile, fort commander Captain Samuel 
Ovenshine had arranged with county authori-
ties to offer a reward for Red Flinn, who had 
left the county and later was located near 
Leavenworth.31 
Whether Cropper really acted in self-de-
fense cannot decisively be determined from 
the disparate accounts, even though his record 
shows no history of similar trouble. 32 Yet the 
fact that disparate accounts exist at all reveals 
how differently the civilian and military com-
munities perceived the incident. Already sus-
picious of the patrol guard, residents now 
thought the army had protected a murderer. 
To prevent further hostility, Ovenshine with-
drew the patrol and returned Hays City to the 
jurisdiction of civil law, the inefficiency of 
which only contributed to Cropper's eventual 
acquittal. By the time the District Court re-
convened after a six-month hiatus, only one 
witness to Doyle's shooting remained in the 
county, and Cropper's case was dismissed for 
lack of suitable jurors.33 
The killings of Allen and Doyle com-
menced years of hostility between the fort and 
town. While Cropper awaited trial, minor con-
flicts between black soldiers and white 
townsfolk continued through 1868, the same 
year Hays City came under control of an orga-
nized vigilante group. The vigilance commit-
tee visited perceived troublemakers and 
ordered them to leave town. Despite their 
stated purpose of establishing peace, vigilan-
tes only increased local violence; thirteen 
documented murders occurred in 1869, the 
town's peak year for homicides.34 While most 
eastetn Kansas newspapers denounced the situ-
ation, at least one, the Lawrence Tribune, partly 
defended vigilante activity by declaring that 
lax law enforcement required citizens to pro-
tect themselves. In recalling the army's protec-
tion of the "murderer" Cropper, the writer 
implied the committee's real purpose was to 
defend the community from black soldiers.35 
In a state known for its supposed racial liberal-
ity, press coverage of events in Hays City par-
alleled what Democratic newspapers said about 
Southern race relations: armed, aggressive 
blacks, protected by a disliked federal mili-
tary, posed threats to public safety. The 
Leavenworth Daily Commercial even likened the 
violence to southern "black outrages" provoked 
by Radical Republicans. 36 Attitudes became 
even more "Confederate sounding" after a 
murder by black soldiers in early 1869 led to 
one of Kansas' few known racial lynchings. 
LEADING TO A LYNCHING 
Civilian and military accounts concur that 
the events of 5 to 7 January began when Pri-
vates Luke Barnes, Lee Watkins, and James 
Ponder were refused admission into a local 
brothel. Prostitutes, in Hays at least, rarely dis-
criminated on skin color, so more than likely 
the men's disruptive behavior prompted the 
refusal. All three belonged to the Thirty-
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eighth Infantry, Company E, and at least two, 
Watkins and Ponder, had enlisted together in 
Nashville and spent detached service away 
from the post, protecting railroad camps.37 Later 
that evening, the trio invaded the shop of a 
black civilian barber named John White. Hid-
ing from the men's rage while they drunkenly 
smashed his shop, White heard the troops boast 
that they planned to get revenge for the deaths 
of their comrades by killing the next white man 
they saw. Wandering into the street, the trio 
opened fire on a Union Pacific watchman 
named J ames Hayes, a ci tizen of Leaven worth. 
Shot in the stomach, his spine severed, Hayes 
lived until the following morning, describing 
his assailants only as "two niggers."38 
Evidence against Barnes, Watkins, and Pon-
der would have been extremely meager with-
out John White's testimony. Accompanied by 
the county sheriff and a federal marshal on J anu-
ary 6, White identified the three out of a line-
up of the entire garrison, explaining the 
vandalism to his shop and their stated intent to 
kill a white person. The barber's testimony 
placed the post commander, Lieutenant Colo-
nel Anderson N elson, in a precarious position. 
Authorities insisted Nelson release the three 
to civilian custody rather than placing them 
under military protection like Cropper. Besides 
the resentment such an action would generate 
among his troops, Nelson must have known 
about the defendants' tenuous safety in a Hays 
jail cell, especially with the vigilance com-
mittee in operation. With tensions between 
soldiers and civilians running high, Nelson 
decided on a conciliatory gesture and permit-
ted county police to assume custody of the pri-
vates, who were arraigned later that day before 
a justice of the peace and placed under over-
night guard. 
Luke Barnes, Lee Watkins, and James Pon-
der never saw their case brought to trial. Dur-
ing the evening of 6-7 January, a mob stormed 
the jail, overpowered the guards, and seized 
the prisoners from their cells. One account re-
ported the mob's size as between seventy-five 
and one hundred, all with masks or darkened 
faces. The vigilantes hanged the men from the 
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FIG. 4. This railroad trestle over Big Creek is the bridge from which the soldiers from Fort Hays Thirty-eighth 
Infantry were lynched in January 1869. Known locally as "Hangman's Bridge," this wooden structure was later 
replaced by a steel bridge. Courtesy of Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas. 
ties of a railroad bridge half a mile west of 
town. Union Pacific employees discovered 
their bodies the next morning. 
Eastern Kansas newspapers, long contemp-
tuous of Hays City's vigilante tradition, sud-
denly applauded the lynching. In James Hayes' 
hometown of Leavenworth, the Daily Commer-
cial delighted in providing a detailed and hear-
say version of the hanging: 
Sometime during the night the vigilantes 
released the mokes from prison and indulged 
them in a dance in mid-air, in which they 
executed a treble shuffle, something of a 
novelty in negro breakdowns which are 
chiefly remarkable for merely a double 
shuffle. No doubt existed of the guilt of the 
parties, as they sloshed around extensively 
brandishing their Springfield rifles, and 
threatening vengeance on the whites. 
The men and brethren appear to be rather 
airy out on the plains, ... Let us have 
peaceP9 
The likelihood that Barnes, Watkins, and Pon-
der would have been convicted and executed 
anyway illustrates this incident's strong racist 
motives. Hays City's high number of homi-
cides shows remarkable tolerance for vio-
lence-except when perpetrated by blacks. 
Rather than simply hanging three killers, the 
lynching issued a statement that racial norms 
concerning troublesome blacks would be en-
forced illegally if necessary. 
RETALIATION FOR LYNCHING 
Unlike other racial lynchings, however, the 
January 1869 episode involved United States 
soldiers, not usually known for meekness in 
the face of violence. Troops of the Thirty-
eighth Infantry performed the unpleasant task 
of retrieving their comrades' bodies and pre-
paring them for burial.4o Rather than intimi-
dating soldiers, the lynching only enraged both 
the officers and enlisted men. Lieutenant Colo-
nel Nelson, whose disastrous decision had 
placed the three within vigilante reach, re-
sponded with his own retaliatory measures. On 
14 January Nelson se!lt a Thirty-eighth detach-
ment into Hays City to arrest all persons out 
after curfew. Black soldiers raided a ballroom 
and arrested fifty-one people, jailing them over-
night at the fort guardhouse. Nelson later wrote 
Governor J ames Harvey that because of the 
rumored plots against his men, he intended to 
close the saloons and livery stables and even 
declare martial law if necessary,41 
Such drastic steps became unnecessary as a 
short-lived calm ensued following the lynch-
ing. In late January, rustlers stole several head 
of livestock from the post herd. The troops-
their tempers running high-blamed locals for 
the theft. On 6 February Tom Butler, a white 
ex-quartermaster's employee who had been 
fired on suspicion of stealing, left town fol-
lowing the Union Pacific tracks east. When a 
mule was reported missing the next day, offi-
cials dispatched a search party which consisted 
of the quartermaster and post surgeon, a civil-
ian detective and numerous employees, and 
ten soldiers from the Thirty-eighth Infantry. 
Tracking and cornering Butler at a water tank, 
the group choked him with a rope until he con-
fessed to participation in a rustling gang. The 
party then divided, with fort officials and em-
ployees in one group and the black troops 
escorting Butler in another. Likely recalling 
their friends' treatment a month earlier, the 
soldiers shot Butler and left his corpse in an 
abandoned house. The mule he supposedly 
had stolen turned up wandering a few miles 
from the fortY 
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Clearly an act of revenge, Butler's murder 
illustrates the complicity of white military au-
thorities. Tired of incessant attacks on the 
army's men and property, white officers will-
ingly sided with black troops in using Butler as 
an example, frustrating any designation of the 
violence as purely racial. A Hays citizen sum-
marized the situation: "There has been for some 
time much unpleasant feeling existing between 
the authorities of Hays City and Ft. Hays, com-
menced by the hanging of the three negro sol-
diers by the Vig's ... "43 Indeed, the bad blood 
between fort and town transcended race, re-
flecting a larger pattern of antipathy charac-
terizing civilian-military relations. In April, 
during the Nineteenth Kansas Cavalry's sta-
tion at Fort Hays, white troops congregated 
nightly in Hays City, engaging in brawls and 
shootings with locals. As both the size and num-
ber of violent episodes increased, large gangs 
of black and white soldiers marched the streets 
armed en masse. Meanwhile, fort officials exer-
cised little control over the troops' nightly so-
journs.44 
SHOOTOUT AND RAMPAGE 
In May 1869 two years of animosity cli-
maxed in an armed confrontation that shared 
many features with modern race riots. Newspa-
pers claimed that black soldiers planned to 
burn Hays City to the ground, a possibility in 
the wake of the lynching. Yet because the 
troops had just been paid and drunkenness and 
fighting often accompanied receipt of wages, 
it appears the violence began with the alco-
hol. According to admittedly biased civilian 
sources, several black infantrymen tried to 
break into a brothel from which they earlier 
had been refused admission. A scuffle began, 
with troops lining up in battle formation and 
opening fire into nearby homes and businesses. 
Townspeople returned the fire, shooting from 
doors and windows and exchanging more than 
four hundred shots in about half an hour. 45 
At this point, fort officials finally took de-
cisive action, dispatching soldiers from the 
Fifth Cavalry to quell the disturbance and or-
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dering all infantrymen back to the post.46 As 
white cavalrymen attempted to break up the 
melee, several residents embarked on a ram-
page against Hays City's few black civilians. 
Vigilante ruffians ordered all black families 
out of town and murdered two African Ameri-
can barbers. Of the newspapers that reported 
the atrocities, only the Kansas Daily Common-
wealth voiced contempt for the deed: 
Hays City has added another laurel to its 
garland of infamy. The other night-after 
the affray-a full account of which appeared 
in our special dispatches-was ended and 
the soldiers had been withdrawn, a party of 
roughs deliberately hunted down and mur-
dered two peaceful and unoffending bar-
bers, who were citizens of the town, and as 
quiet and harmless men as it afforded. Hon-
est and decent men will want for language 
to express their indignation at this brutal 
and cowardly outrage.47 
Apparently, the two barbers became the only 
fatalities during the evening's chaos. The post 
surgeon recorded no gunfire injuries but news-
papers reported six wounded civilians, includ-
ing a U.S. Deputy Marshal, and a white trooper 
from the Seventh Cavalry.48 
While the events of 3 May definitely had 
racial motivations, classifying them as a "race 
riot" is not quite accurate, occurring as they 
did during a period of vigilante activity. In its 
coverage of the incident, the Commonwealth 
even pointed out that not all the discord de-
rived from blacks' or even the military's prox-
imity: 
... it is certain that human life and limbs 
are altogether too unsafe in that locality. 
Every trifling dispute is settled by an instan-
taneous appeal to the pistol or the knife. 
All things considered, Hays City is one of 
the best places to move away from that can 
be found upon the globe.49 
Buffalo soldiers proved a contributing but 
not determinative factor in the town's history 
of conflict. In late April and early May, the 
Thirty-eighth companies relocated to new as-
signments on the Mexican border, leaving Fort 
Hays with fewer than a hundred troops by sum-
mer of 1869.50 Even so, the community's repu-
tation for bloodshed continued, with friction 
between soldiers and civilians remaining a con-
stant. In 1871, a saloon brawl involving white 
troops escalated into gunfire, resulting in the 
death of the county sheriff. 51 
One should not isolate racial tensions from 
their larger social context and exaggerate their 
importance over other causes of violence. Yet 
the buffalo soldiers' presence did produce long-
lasting hostility toward the black population. 
As the Daily Tribune stated, "Hays City seems 
to have many of the same ideas that unrecon-
structed rebels have, to wit: that negroes have 
no rights which a white man is bound to re-
spect."52 Following their eviction in May 1869, 
some black families were permitted to return, 
a decision most later regretted. In March 1871, 
four residents were arraigned for invading the 
home of an elderly black woman and raping 
her. Whites expressed disgust that the men were 
arrested on the word of "colored people." Fear-
ing for their safety, the fort commander per-
mitted all black families to relocate into 
dugouts on the post for protection, with troops 
once again sent into town to restore order. 53 
The 1869 lynching and other such episodes 
firmly established the area's reputation as an 
unsafe place for African Americans. An ob-
server in 1909 commented on the community's 
white homogeneity: 
no negro has ever ventured to make Hays a 
place of residence. An occasional straggler 
has worked a few days in town, but the his-
tory of the place has appealed too strongly 
to his imagination for him to remain. 54 
CONCLUSION 
Fort Hays's predominantly black garrison 
and its hostile relationship with citizens in Hays 
City provides an example of how civilian/mili-
tary social interaction helped to transfer racial 
hatreds to the newly conquered region. The 
years from 1867 to 1869 saw African Ameri-
cans' introduction to regular army life, the be-
ginning of a twenty-year process in which they 
would forcibly help to seize western lands from 
American Indians. Prejudice always remained 
a factor in their lives but as the Hays City ex-
perience indicates, their active involvement 
in a local cycle of hatred obscured whatever 
achievements whites might have recognized 
and intensified racist paranoia. 
Whether black soldiers' participation in an 
occupying army deserves praise or criticism, of 
course, remains a matter of individual perspec-
tive and moral judgment, an arena in which 
the historian can claim no particular author-
ity. Yet if history teaches any lesson, it is that 
one group's pride may be another's tragedy. As 
Vernon Bellecourt has asked "Which do we 
value more, a wildly bastardized fable of 
progress and equality, or truth? Justice is the 
act of conscious, informed human beings."55 In 
the recent rush to reveal the buffalo soldiers' 
past, historians should not forget the dual im-
portance of understanding their legacy, lest new 
myths be created similar to those that once 
depicted white soldiers like Custer as heroes. 
Furthermore, the buffalo soldiers existed not 
only as enlistees in the fight against Indians 
but as actors in a complex theatre of negotia-
tions framed by civilian whites' racism and the 
usual conflicts between army and civilians in 
a garrison town. Just as ethnocentric interpre-
tations once regarded black history as insig-
nificant, romanticizing the buffalo soldiers' 
experience not only perpetuates distortion, but 
it also robs them of the right to be judged not 
as representatives of an entire race but as hu-
man beings capable of human error. 
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